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SPECIAL ISSUE • Disability and Conditional Social Security Beneits
Benefits conditionality for disabled people: 
stylised facts from a review of international 
evidence and practice
Ben Baumberg Geiger, b.b.geiger@kent.ac.uk 
University of Kent, UK
While behavioural conditionality for disability beneit claimants has been increasing, there is little 
evidence on its implementation or impacts. This article summarises existing studies, alongside an 
international review based on 140 documents and 38 expert interviews, into four ‘stylised facts’: (1) 
requirements for disability beneit claimants are common, but sanctioning is rare; (2) assessment 
and support are critical for implementing conditionality; (3) limited but robust existing evidence 
suggests that sanctioning may have zero or even negative impacts on work-related outcomes for 
disabled people; and (4) individual case studies suggest that sanctioning can lead to destitution 
and affect mental health.
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Introduction
Over the past 25 years, there has been an increasing turn towards behavioural 
conditionality in the beneits system (Clasen and Clegg, 2011: 338), in which claimants 
are required to carry out work-related activities under the threat of cuts to their 
beneits (‘sanctions’). While this initially focused on unemployed people and single 
parents, there has been a more recent move to extend conditionality to disability 
beneit claimants, not just in Anglo-Saxon countries, but also in Scandinavia and 
beyond. This has been actively encouraged by the inluential international think tank 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which 
























































by … avoiding, as far as possible, exemptions from job-search and participation 
requirements’ (OECD, 2015: 150), or, in more detail:
The operation of a disability beneit scheme [presently] difers drastically 
from that of an unemployment beneit scheme, with strict participation 
requirements in the latter but not in the former. This diference is justiied 
for people who are unable to work but not for the much larger number of 
those who have partial work capacity.… [Instead,] beneit payments should 
be linked to the willingness of the beneiciary to co-operate with the 
responsible authority and engage in employability-enhancing and, where 
appropriate, job-search activities. (OECD, 2010: 13)
Yet, despite these strong prescriptions and a growing international trend, the OECD 
presents only high-level discussions about the implementation of conditionality 
for disabled people, and presents no direct evidence on its impacts. In this article, 
I review published evidence and case studies of international practice to present a 
series of ‘stylised facts’ about disability and conditionality (an approach taken from 
Martin, 2015). The article focuses, in turn, on three key questions: ‘How common 
internationally is conditionality for disabled people?’; ‘How is conditionality for 
disabled people implemented internationally?’; and ‘What impact does conditionality 
have on disabled people?’.
This partly comes from a review of the existing academic and grey literature, and 
partly from a wider international review of disability assessment in 10 countries, 
which includes seven of the nine countries with the most activating disability beneit 
systems according to the OECD (2009: 232). Here, I focus on seven countries that have 
attempted to implemented disability conditionality in some form (the Netherlands, 
Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the UK, the US and Australia). The review 
focuses on how administrative systems respond to people with broadly deined chronic 
illness and disability (hereafter, ‘disability’), rather than seeing how systems would treat 
claimants with a speciic a priori deinition of disability. Understanding of each case was 
primarily obtained from documentary analysis, with over 140 documents reviewed, 
supplemented by 38 expert interviews. Understanding the context of individual 
policies is always challenging in international research, and the broad international 
scope necessarily comes at the price of depth.
Policymakers must also consider the ethics of conditionality. Aside from ethical 
objections to conditionality per se (Standing, 2011), there may be particular 
ethical objections to conditionality for disabled people given disabling societies 
and discriminatory employers (Patrick et al, 2011). Others conversely argue that 
conditionality is necessary for legitimacy (Pickles et al, 2016). Yet, these ethical debates 
are themselves often bound up with the empirical evidence – whether conditionality 
can be implemented fairly, and whether it has positive outcomes for both the state and 
for beneit claimants themselves (Molander and Torsvik, 2015). This article therefore 
focuses on the evidence itself in order to enable others to subject potential policy 
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How common is conditionality for disabled people?
Disability benefits
Where conditionality for disabled people presently exists, there is always one group 
of disabled people who are required to take steps towards work, alongside another 
group of disabled people who are exempt. Those subject to conditionality are either 
separated into a particular category within the disability beneit (the UK), separated 
into a sickness beneit (the Scandinavian countries) or put on a wider beneit that also 
includes people without disabilities (Australia). Whichever structure is used, the on-
paper requirements placed on disabled people are often based on the ‘rehabilitation-
before-beneit principle’ (OECD, 2010: 107). For example:
• In Australia, all but the most severely disabled people are required to show ‘active 
participation in a program of support’ for 18 months before being eligible for the 
disability beneit (Department of Social Services, 2016). During this time, they 
claim Newstart Allowance alongside single parents and unemployed people, with 
conditionality requirements being lessened for 19% and temporarily suspended 
for 17% of claimants at any one time (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016). 
Young (under-40) disability beneit claimants are also required to attend work-
focused interviews.
• In Norway, when people move on to the long-term sick leave beneit after 
one year, they are required to participate in work-related activity based around 
an individual action plan (OECD, 2013a: 161). This is similar to the system in 
Sweden, where many people on sick leave are required to attend a face-to-face 
meeting (‘Sassam’) for which non-participation can result in sanctions (Engström 
et al, forthcoming).
• In Denmark, people are referred for a multidisciplinary rehabilitation team 
assessment after an initial period of sickness absence. The assessment is not meant 
to award people with a disability pension until all eforts at rehabilitation have 
been exhausted; instead, the assessment sends them on a rehabilitation programme 
that they are required to participate in (see later). While individuals can refuse 
medical treatments, they are required to accept non-medical health-related 
treatments (Beskæftigelsesministeriet, 2016).
An alternative to the rehabilitation-before-beneit principle can be found in the UK, 
where disabled people are sorted into those subject to conditionality (known as the 
‘Work-Related Activity Group’ [WRAG]) on the basis of a functional capacity test. 
I go into more detail about these systems later in the section on implementation.
While requirements are common, actual sanctioning of disabled people seems rare. 
For example, Germany has a conditional unemployment beneit with high levels of 
sanctioning: over a million sanctions were applied in 2015 (Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 
2016). However, only 8,700 sanctions were for failures to report for the medical or 
psychological service. Examining this is harder elsewhere as most countries do not 
publish data on sanctions for disabled claimants. Nevertheless, there are anecdotal 
reports from the Netherlands (NVVG, 2010), Germany (Aurich-Beerheide and 
Brussig, 2017), Denmark (Mehlsen et al, 2015), Norway and Sweden (Hultqvist and 
























































more fully later. Claimants may still be worried about the possibility of sanctions (eg 
in Norway, see Breimo, 2016: 71), but the sanctions seem to be rarely carried through.
The exceptions to this are Australia and the UK, both of which publish unusually 
transparent data. In Australia, nearly 150,000 sanctions were applied in the irst 
quarter of 2016 to claimants who are likely to have a disability (claimants in jobactive 
stream C or with Disability Employment Services), about one quarter of all sanctions 
(Department of Employment, 2016). (Figures on the sanction rate are unfortunately 
not available.)These are predominantly temporary suspensions until the claimant 
starts complying, but a substantial minority are longer-lasting. Moreover, over 10,000 
job-seekers in this period were sanctioned after giving a medical reason for non-
attendance that was not accepted as reasonable.
The sanctioning of disabled people is also prevalent in the UK. At its peak in 
August 2014, 125,000 disability beneit (WRAG – see earlier) sanction referrals 
were being made each year, with almost 50,000 initial sanctions (where beneits are 
stopped pending potential challenges), and resulting in 35,000 conirmed sanctions 
(for sources and notes, see Web Appendix 1). Sanctions during 2009–10 were 
primarily for not attending interviews, whereas sanctions during 2013–15 were 
primarily for ‘not carrying out activity’, which is primarily failing to take part in 
the contractor-led ‘Work Programme’. While sanctioning is still rare among those 
subject to conditionality (3% of WRAG claimants were sanctioned in 2014/15; see 
Webster, 2016b), it is clearly happening at a non-negligible scale, with over 400,000 
conirmed sanctions being applied to disability beneit claimants since conditionality 
was introduced in 2008.
Non-disability benefits
Some disabled people are also subject to conditionality within non-disability beneits 
after being assessed as fully capable of work, especially as many countries have tightened 
eligibility for disability beneits (Clasen and Clegg, 2011: 338). Conditionality on these 
beneits is sometimes more demanding (and incurs greater penalties) than on disability 
beneits. However, there are often few data available, and no comparable data using 
consistent disability deinitions across countries. Nevertheless, there are data showing 
that, for example, 25% of disabled people in the US claim a non-disability beneit 
such as food stamps (the Supplementary Nutrition Assistance Program [SNAP]), 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or unemployment insurance 
(Houtenville and Brucker, 2014).
The only country for which more detailed data are available is the UK, which 
publishes transparent igures on sanctioning among unemployment beneit claimants 
who self-declare a disability – though it is important to note the limitations of this 
self-declared disability data. The igures show that throughout 2000–15, 20–30% 
of unemployment beneit sanctions have been applied to disabled people. In total, 
across disability and non-disability beneits, 170,000 sanction referrals are made about 
disabled people in the UK every year (down from a peak of 620,000, as shown in 
Figure 1), of which 90,000 (250,000 at the peak) were subsequently conirmed 
as a sanction. While failure to attend an adviser interview was the main reason 
for sanctions in the early part of the period, failure to participate in work-related 
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and particularly work-related failures (such as not looking for work) became more 
important on the unemployment beneit from 2011.
Not only are such sanctions not uncommon in the UK, but it even appears that 
disabled unemployment beneit claimants are more likely to be sanctioned than non-
disabled claimants. New estimates presented for the irst time in this article (based on 
oicial statistics, and detailed in Web Appendix 1) show that the sanctioning rate for 
disabled people on unemployment beneit is higher than for non-disabled people – 
much higher in 2010 (disabled people being 50–53% more likely to be sanctioned), 
and still noticeably higher for the latest available statistics in 2014 (26–28% more likely). 
This is consistent with other estimates that, for example, homeless unemployment 
beneit claimants are much more likely to be sanctioned than others (Batty et al, 
2015: 10).
It is not possible to look at the share of disabled unemployment beneit claimants in 
the UK who are sanctioned each month. However, we know that the proportion of 
all unemployment beneit claimants who were sanctioned over a 12-month period 
was 12.9% in 2014/15, down from a peak of 18.4% in 2013/14, and compared to 
10–12% during 2007–10 (Webster, 2016b). Over a longer period of six years, 24% 
of unemployment beneit claimants are sanctioned (21% after challenges) – and 
noticeably more if we focus on those claiming for more than a year (Webster, 2016a). 
While sanctions are not the majority experience for unemployment beneit claimants 
in the UK, neither are they a marginal experience. Combined with the sanctions on 
the disability beneit (see earlier), more than 2.7 million sanction referrals have been 
made for disabled people in the UK since 2008, including 350,000 initial sanctions 
that were later overturned and 1.2 million conirmed sanctions.
Figure 1: Sanctions given to disabled benefit claimants in the UK, by benefit and reason 
(last 12 months, rolling)

























































How is conditionality for disabled people implemented?
The international literature has often distinguished two ways in which activation 
can be implemented: one that invests heavily in human capital; and one that relies 
on conditionality/sanctioning (Dingeldey, 2007). However, this may be misleading 
because (as Dingeldey argues) states can become both more enabling and move towards 
workfare – for example, there could be increased investment in employment support 
alongside increased levels of sanctioning. Moreover, when we focus on disability, the 
critical issue is investment in assessment (in order to assess what people are capable 
of) and employment support (in order to have suitable activities to require them to 
do), rather than human capital in general.
In this section, I therefore consider a typology of how conditionality is implemented 
in diferent countries, which combines two dimensions: (1) the level of conditionality 
itself; and (2) the extent to which conditionality is linked to rehabilitation (see Figure 
2).
Ideal type 1: demanding systems (high conditionality, strong rehabilitation 
link)
The irst type of conditionality for disabled beneit claimants is a ‘demanding’ system: 
it can be broadly characterised as providing intensive assessment and rehabilitation 
to disabled beneit claimants, which they are then obliged to take up. Closest to 
this type is Denmark, where claimants are only eligible for a disability pension if 
rehabilitation has previously been attempted (or would not be expected to have an 
efect), and almost no under-40s are initially eligible (Hultqvist and Nørup, 2017). 
Instead, the assessment usually decides on appropriate, mandatory rehabilitation 
activities. Sanctioning practices seem to vary by municipality; some municipalities do 
not even threaten sanctions as they feel that this is counterproductive, whereas other 
municipalities use threats for those who are not motivated to participate (Mehlsen 
et al, 2015). Even in the latter case, however, sanctions themselves are rare.
Investment in expert assessment is central to the Danish process. Caseworkers are 
irst obliged to complete a preparatory rehabilitation plan with the claimant, based on 
a one-hour interview (OECD, 2013b: 102). This is then fed into a multidisciplinary 
rehabilitation team, which, in practice, includes four to six people representing 
multiple sectors, such as employment, health, social services and education (Deloitte, 
2015). The other crucial element is employment support, and the multidisciplinary 
rehabilitation team have three options open to them. First, in the common situation 
that an individual’s work capacity is unclear, they can be sent on a work trial/work 
Figure 2: Typology of implementation of conditionality
LOW conditionality HIGH conditionality
Conditionality WEAKLY linked to 
rehabilitation
Passive systems Compliance-based systems
Conditionality STRONGLY linked 
to rehabilitation
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test (‘arbejdsprøvet/arbejdsprøvning’), after which the clariied understanding of the 
individual’s work capacity is fed back into a future meeting. Second, individuals can 
be sent on Resource Activation (‘Ressourceforløb’), a rehabilitation programme 
lasting for one to ive years. Third, individuals with some work capacity but who 
would be unable to get a job in the open labour market can be put on the ‘Flex-Job’ 
scheme. This provides considerable subsidies to employers to employ disabled people 
with as little as 1 hour a week work capacity. Here, activation is closely linked to 
conditionality (Hultqvist and Nørup, 2017); indeed, even before the latest round of 
reforms, jobcentre executives in 2008 agreed that one of their most important jobs 
was ‘to use activation as a work-test’ (Bredgaard and Larsen, 2008).
Other systems that are closest to the ‘demanding’ type include the WeCARE 
programme for welfare (TANF) recipients in New York City, where, unlike in the 
majority of US states, disabled claimants are required to participate in TANF. Again, 
there is investment in assessment (a bio-psychosocial assessment with a certiied 
physician), and employment support (condition management supported by a case 
manager; see Collins, 2015). It seems that conditionality is not implemented harshly 
– people can reschedule appointments easily – although the provider also meets their 
contractual obligations to closely monitor the time that claimants spend on work-
related activity. Another example comes from the Netherlands, where claimants can 
again be sanctioned if they refuse to participate. However, oicial guidelines make 
clear that four steps are necessary before the conclusion that participation behaviour 
is inadequate, with each step encouraging the participant to resume participation 
(NVVG, 2010). It is only when all of these steps have failed that sanctions can be 
applied, and, as a result, both claimants and insurance physicians report that sanctions 
are rare (NVVG, 2010).
It is di cult to know if the WeCARE, Dutch or Danish systems are successful. 
There seems to be no current public criticism of WeCARE, which is striking given 
that the programme was subject to a successful class action disability discrimination 
lawsuit in the 2000s (for requiring people to go to oices far away from their homes). 
There has been public criticism of the Danish system, but not because of sanctioning 
(although see Hultqvist and Nørup, 2017); instead, public concerns have focused on 
the appropriateness of forcing people with very low work capacity to go through a 
practical work evaluation or Resource Activation – in one widely reported case, a 
capacity to work of half an hour, twice a week (Lauth, 2015).
The efectiveness of these systems is therefore uncertain, and, furthermore, it does 
not seem that sanctioning is widespread in any of these systems (see earlier). They are 
therefore not as conditional as the compliance-based systems discussed later, despite 
being classiied as ‘high conditionality’ here. Still, from an implementation perspective, 
the Danish system and other examples such as New York and the Netherlands 
exemplify a form of conditionality that seems to require people to do activities that 
they are capable of by investing in assessment and employment support.
Ideal type 2: passive systems (low conditionality, weak rehabilitation link)
In a ‘passive’ system of disability conditionality, there are formal conditionality 
requirements for disability beneit claimants, but this is only weakly linked to the 
support and opportunities available for them to move towards work. It therefore 
























































partly because it is less clear to front-line staf if the person in question is capable of 
the activity, and partly because suitable activities to refer them to may not exist. Front-
line staf may respond by simply not implementing conditionality in the way that 
formal policies propose, as seems to occur to some extent in Norway and Germany.
On paper, the Norwegian Work Assessment Allowance (WAA) is one of the most 
activating disability beneits worldwide. As the OECD (2013a: 161) have approvingly 
noted, WAA is a conditional disability beneit based around a mandatory activity plan, 
and there is suicient investment in rehabilitation services that front-line staf can refer 
WAA claimants to suitable work-related activities. (There are only a few exceptional 
circumstances where people can claim the beneit without having a plan, primarily 
during waiting periods; see NAV, 2015). Many of the letters from the social insurance 
agency repeat that complying with the activity plan is a condition of receiving the 
beneit, and it does appear that disability beneit claimants do feel that they need to 
comply with their individual action (Breimo, 2016: 71). After a maximum of four 
years, claimants are either found capable of work, found eligible for the permanent 
disability pension (with no activation requirements) or their work capacity is not 
considered to be clariied, in which case, they often move on to social assistance.
In practice, however, even the OECD (2013a: 154) concede that ‘implementation 
of the procedure has been a challenge’. The assessment of work capacity relies on 
front-line workers who are often unsure of a person’s work capacity (Gjersøe, 2016). 
Moreover, even where front-line workers are convinced that a person is unemployable, 
they do not want to refer someone to a disability pension if this might be denied by 
the back oice. This is partly because they do not want an unemployable claimant to 
be in a inancially precarious position, and partly because denied disability pension 
applications must leave WAA in order to reapply, which only serves to generate more 
work for front-line workers (Gjersøe, 2016: 138). As a result, the activation of disabled 
people can become a way to let claimants ‘loat’ (as one advisor put it in Gjersøe, 
2016), and is used to build evidence of unemployability for a disability pension 
application, rather than helping claimants move towards employment. Unsurprisingly, 
a government-appointed committee has recently argued that assessment and activation 
need to be reformed (Vågeng Expert Committee, cited by Gjersøe, 2015: 12).
Similar issues can be seen in Germany, particularly in the article in the present 
special issue (Aurich-Beerheide and Brussig, 2017). While another oft-cited example 
of rehabilitation-before-beneits (OECD, 2010: 108), in practice, both conditionality 
and rehabilitation are limited. Partly, this is due to problems with the assessment of 
work capacity, which is done by a pension fund doctor who crudely reports the 
number of hours per day that a person is capable of working. This gives relatively 
little guidance about activation to front-line workers, who themselves have limited 
expertise in health-related issues, have limited time to build up a rapport with the 
claimant and struggle to efectively use the specialist medical services available. 
Moreover, it seems that people with health problems are generally protected by job 
centres, who have considerable discretion and whose incentives motivate them to only 
use sanctions where they feel that this will get people into work – something that 
they seem to feel often does not apply to those with more limited working capacity. 
Finally, the rehabilitation that is supposed to occur before disability pensions is a 
casualty of complex inter-organisational governance issues and incentive structures 
(see also Rauch and Dornette, 2010). As Aurich-Beerheide and Brussig conclude, 
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or the public employment service, which has a work focus but concentrates this on 
non-disabled people who are felt to be closer to the labour market.
Ideal type 3: compliance-based systems (high conditionality, weak 
rehabilitation link)
The previous section suggested that a lack of investment in assessment and 
rehabilitation makes it di cult to implement conditionality in practice. However, in 
‘compliance-based’ systems, not only are requirements placed on disabled claimants 
despite problems with assessment or rehabilitation, but non-negligible numbers of 
claimants are sanctioned due to their failures to comply with these formal requirements. 
This comes at a cost: it seems less likely to help disability beneit claimants towards 
employment (as we discuss later), and may place requirements on claimants that some 
are simply unable to meet.
The UK seems to exemplify this. The decision about whether claimants should be 
subject to conditionality at all (whether on unemployment beneits or the ‘WRAG’ 
group of disability beneit claimants)1 is governed by a functional capacity assessment 
that has been beset by problems, and that simply does not directly assess people’s 
capacity to undertake work-related activity (Baumberg et al, 2015). Once claimants are 
allocated to one of these groups, decisions about conditionality depend on front-line 
staf (and government ‘decision-makers’ who conirm sanctioning decisions). The UK 
is not unique in depending on front-line staf, but this has caused particular problems:
• Front-line staf are often low-skilled and have little health-speciic training, 
particularly for the unemployment benefit. While more skilled disability 
employment advisors do exist, they are inconsistently available and inconsistently 
used.
• Front-line staf do not always have suicient discretion. Until March 2015, 
unemployment beneit claimants were not allowed to have more than two periods 
of two weeks’ sickness without becoming ineligible for the beneit, and front-line 
staf did not realise that they could tailor conditionality for those with health 
conditions/impairments (Work and Pensions Committee, 2014: 37). For disability 
beneit and unemployment beneit claimants on the contractor-run ‘Work 
Programme’, contractors were required to refer claimants for possible sanction 
even if the contractor believed that there was good reason for non-participation.
• Front-line staf have sometimes been monitored against performance standards 
that included sanctioning rates (PCS, 2014). While not formally a ‘target’, this 
nevertheless seems to have strongly inluenced the behaviour of front-line staf 
to sanction claimants even if they did not judge that this would help move 
claimants towards work.
Alongside these challenges around assessment, there have been challenges in providing 
appropriate employment support for disabled people. Some intensive support exists, but 
most disabled claimants have been placed on the contractor-run ‘Work Programme’, 
where there have been complaints about the quality and appropriateness of support 
(see also McNeill et al, 2017), and where employment outcomes for disabled people 
























































While sanctioning is only applied to a minority of claimants (see earlier), the non-
negligible sanctioning rate has resulted in a number of cases where conditionality 
seems to have been inappropriately applied to disabled people, particularly for those 
on the unemployment beneit. For example, a recent qualitative academic research 
project interviewed 56 disabled unemployment and disability beneit claimants, of 
which 21 reported being sanctioned:
Those who had been sanctioned reported being unable to attend 
appointments due to ill health, or being unaware of appointments. The latter 
could be due to poor communication (including letters going missing in the 
post) or not fully understanding the behavioural requirements attached to 
beneit receipt. Accordingly, they were unanimous in stating that their loss 
of beneit was inappropriate. (Dwyer et al, 2016: 8)
The case studies in this special issue – taken from the same project – provide more 
detailed illustrations (McNeill et al, 2017). Among many other similar pieces of 
evidence, a convenience survey of 500 WRAG claimants found that many felt that 
the work-related activity was not tailored to their capacities (Hale, 2014), and a 
parliamentary select committee found that it was not uncommon for those with mental 
health conditions and learning di culties to be set inappropriate requirements that 
resulted in sanctions (Work and Pensions Committee, 2015). While these case studies 
and convenience samples are not necessarily representative, and many only consider 
the claimant perspective, such practices would not be surprising given the design 
of the system, and we have already seen earlier that the sanctioning rate for disabled 
people on the unemployment beneit is noticeably higher than for non-disabled 
people. These concerns do not seem to exist on this scale in countries closer to the 
‘demanding’ ideal type of disability conditionality, where sanctioning seems to be an 
emergency backstop for wholescale refusal to engage with rehabilitation (following 
expert assessment), rather than a non-negligible response by less well-trained staf to 
minor non-compliance.
In Australia, there seems to be greater level of investment in Disability Employment 
Services for those disabled claimants subject to conditionality, and it is perhaps not as 
clear an example of a compliance-based system as the UK. Nevertheless, in a recent 
consultation, there was ‘widespread, almost universal concern’ about the beneit 
eligibility assessment (Department of Social Services, 2015: 3). Many stakeholders 
reported that assessments were done on a tick-box basis, sometimes not face-to-face, 
nor by appropriately expert assessors, and based on a ‘confusing’ categorisation of 
claimants based on the hours a week that they are seen to be capable of – with the 
result that claimants were being referred to ‘inappropriate services’ (Department of 
Social Services, 2015: 4).
It is unclear whether this currently leads to inappropriate sanctioning in Australia. 
Historically, there have been complaints that this sanctioning has not been consistently 
fair for those with mental illness or at crisis periods (Jones et al, 2007), and the OECD 
have noted that some welfare-to-work providers described sanctioning practices as, 
at times, ‘deeply lawed, punitive, damaging, and causing signiicant detriment and 
harm’ (OECD, 2012: 157–63) – particularly for those with learning di culties or 
mental health problems that are not necessarily disclosed (Disney et al, 2010). Yet, at 
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easily circumvented by citing illness (Disney et al, 2010; OECD, 2012: 157–63), and 
it seems that the extensive use of individual exemptions may partly mitigate problems 
with the assessment (McClure et al, 2015: 133). Overall, it is clear that there are non-
negligible rates of sanctioning of disabled claimants, just as in the UK (see earlier), 
but there is too little recent research to know if implementation di culties also exist.
Ideal type 4: supportive systems (low conditionality, strong rehabilitation link)
Within the typology of disability conditionality outlined earlier, a inal theoretical 
possibility is for conditionality to exist on paper, allied to a strong rehabilitation 
focus, but alongside low levels of conditionality in practice. Given that the focus 
of the international review was on countries that try to implement higher levels of 
conditionality (even if these are unsuccessfully implemented), there are no examples 
of ‘supportive’ systems within the countries selected here – though it is perhaps close 
to the autonomy-focused conditionality of the Swedish system, as described elsewhere 
in this special issue (Hultqvist and Nørup, 2017).
What impact does conditionality have on disabled people?
In examining the evidence base about the efect of conditionality on disabled people, 
there are four key questions: ‘Does conditionality increase employment for non-
disabled people, for which there is a relatively extensive evidence base?’; ‘How far 
would we expect this wider evidence on conditionality to apply to disabled people?’; ‘Is 
there any direct evidence that conditionality speciically for disabled people improves 
employment outcomes?’; and ‘What are the wider impacts of conditionality?’.
Does conditionality increase employment among non-disabled people?
Over the past decade, a number of studies have looked at the impact of sanctioning on 
employment outcomes among unemployment or social assistance beneit claimants. 
There are several methods that can be used. One is to compare the outcomes of 
claimants who are sanctioned compared to claimants who are not, but even when this 
is done well (eg Wu et al, 2014), it is di cult to be conident that we are picking up 
the efect of sanctions rather than diferences in the sort of people who are sanctioned. 
Instead, more robust studies look at the impact of the timing of sanctions on the 
beneit trajectories of sanctioned claimants, or look at natural experiments such as 
randomised policy pilots (or, failing that, quasi-experiments such as local variation 
in sanction rates), which have the added advantage of enabling us to look at ‘threat’ 
efects on those who are not sanctioned. None of these methods gives us absolute 
certainty, but these give us the strongest basis we can have for understanding the 
impacts of sanctioning (Griggs and Evans, 2010; McVicar, 2014).
This evidence shows that sanctioning increases short-term job entries. This is the 
conclusion of the few reviews that exist (McVicar, 2014; National Audit Oice, 2016), 
with one describing the evidence as ‘compelling’ (Griggs and Evans, 2010) – though 
it is worth noting that none of these are formal systematic reviews, and the individual 
studies difer widely in the estimated size of this efect. Moreover, there are two crucial 
























































• While sanctions cause some people to leave beneits for work, they cause other people to 
leave beneits without having a job. This has been shown in several studies (eg Arni 
et al, 2013; Busk, 2016; National Audit Oice, 2016), and may be particularly 
strong for (though not restricted to) more advantaged claimants (Busk, 2016).
• While sanctions increase employment, they cause people to be in worse (lower-paying, more 
unstable, more part-time) jobs. While Arni et al’s (2013) study is often cited here, 
there are several other studies that come to similar results, for example, showing 
that increased days in employment translated to weak or zero gains in earnings 
(National Audit Oice, 2016), or that sanctioning led to considerable increases in 
part-time rather than full-time work (Van den Berg and Vikström, 2014). While 
one recent article argues that these efects are simply because sanctions move 
people with historically lower earnings into employment (Lachowska et al, 2016), 
recent reviews share a consensus that short-term positive efects of sanctioning 
on employment need to be balanced against longer-term negative impacts on 
earnings (Griggs and Evans, 2010; McVicar, 2014; National Audit Oice, 2016).
While I have concentrated on the evidence on sanctioning here, the smaller evidence 
base on job-search monitoring shows similar (if slightly less consistent) results 
(McVicar, 2014).
Would we expect conditionality to increase employment for disabled people?
At its simplest, conditionality is based on three assumptions: that it will make claimants 
less selective about the jobs that they are willing to take, try harder to ind work (Griggs 
and Evans, 2010; Arni et al, 2013) and take fuller advantage of the support available to 
them. However, this has to be balanced against other mechanisms at play. Being less 
selective about jobs may make people move into work more quickly, but it may also 
lead them into poorer job matches, taking worse jobs that waste some of their human 
capital (Arni et al, 2013). There may be a ‘lock-in efect’ of work-related activity that 
diverts job-seekers from looking for suitable work (Molander and Torsvik, 2015). It 
may also undermine their relationship with their caseworker, which evidence suggests 
is one of the most important elements of employment support services (Hasluck and 
Green, 2007), and more generally lead to more supericial compliance with (or even 
disconnection from) government-provided support.
The balance of these efects for non-disabled people was summarised in the 
previous section. The critical question here, however, is whether this balance will 
be the same for disabled people. It has been argued that there are many people with 
partial work capacity who do not voluntarily take up support when it is ofered; 
hence, conditionality could have positive efects for disabled people (Martin, 2015). 
However, other a priori considerations suggest a more negative efect.
Partly, this is because it is harder to apply conditionality fairly for disabled people 
– and unfair conditionality is unlikely to have positive impacts. This is even accepted 
by those in favour of conditionality; for example, a UK pro-conditionality think-tank 
conceded that ‘it is undoubtedly the case that misapplied, conditionality runs the risk 
of worsening the position of the most vulnerable claimants’ (Pickles et al, 2016: 43). 
Moreover, people with certain sorts of disabilities (eg cognitive impairments) may not 
be consistently aware of the requirements being placed on them, as has been reported 
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the light of the review of implementation, we would expect more positive impacts 
from ‘demanding’ systems (with considerable investment in assessing claimants fully, 
and providing rehabilitation that they are required to do) than ‘compliance-based’ 
systems (where less support is provided for claimants to move towards work, and 
where unreasonable requirements are more likely).
More importantly, though, many welfare-to-work professionals, disability charities 
and disabled people themselves think that conditionality is not suited to the 
employment issues facing disabled people (Mehlsen et al, 2015; Work and Pensions 
Committee, 2016: #66). Conditionality implies that disabled people are partly out 
of work because of a lack of motivation, which has been criticised for ignoring the 
real barriers that they face (eg Patrick et al, 2011; Garthwaite, 2014). However, even 
where claimants have some work capacity and may be able to get a job, they are often 
uncertain about their capacity to work and require considerable support. Claimants’ 
relationship with their caseworker becomes critical, as does their willingness to 
experiment with a job in a safe context in which failure is not punished (arguably 
a key component of the success of the positively evaluated Individual Placement 
and Support model; see Nygren et al, 2016). Conditionality can undermine both 
the relationship with the caseworker (Work and Pensions Committee, 2016: #16) 
and this willingness to experiment. Rather than encouraging claimants to move 
towards work, it can lead to fear and anxiety (see later), prompting people to ‘hunker 
down’ (in the words of Paul Gregg, one of the architects of the UK’s conditionality 
system2). Again, using the typology from earlier in the article, this is likely to be an 
even greater problem in ‘compliance-based’ systems of disability conditionality than 
‘demanding’ systems.
Direct evidence on conditionality for disabled people
This makes it crucial to have direct evidence on the impact of conditionality on 
disabled people, and while such evidence is rare, a small number of studies have 
recently been published.3
Four studies look at the introduction of mandatory activities for sick and disabled 
people, in Sweden (Engström et al, forthcoming), Denmark (Rehwald et al, 2015), 
Norway (Markussen et al, 2015) and Australia (Broadway et al, 2014). The target group 
for the reform was either those near the start of sickness absence (all sick leave claims 
in Denmark, vague sickness diagnoses in Sweden), those after six months of sickness 
absence (Norway) or young disability beneit claimants (Australia). For Norway, 
Sweden and Australia, the policy being evaluated was a compulsory rehabilitation-
focused meeting, while in Denmark, the policy was much more intensive, involving 
weekly meetings and the requirement to be participating in a return-to-work 
programme to continue claiming the beneit. Some discretion was usually allowed; 
hence, not all claimants were required to undergo conditionality.4 The studies were 
varied in their methodology, being based on either variation across geography and/
or time (Norway), comparing similar groups not afected by the reform (Australia), 
or randomised policy trials (Sweden and Denmark).
In contrast to the studies on non-disabled people mentioned earlier, some of these 
studies show negative impacts of conditionality on disabled people. This includes the 
intervention closest to the ‘demanding’ ideal type of conditionality, which looked 
























































focused meetings (the Danish study of Rehwald et al, 2015). Such conditionality led 
to sick claimants spending one week less in regular employment in the following 
year (5% less than the control group), with similar efects after two years (though the 
efect had efectively worn of by the third year).5 The Swedish trial (Engström et 
al, forthcoming) also found that mandatory activation interviews led to higher levels 
of later disability pension receipt, though they only mention employment outcomes 
in passing. The other two studies show slightly diferent results. The introduction 
of mandatory interviews for young disability beneit claimants in Australia led to 
increased referrals to disability employment services, but had no signiicant impact 
on employment or earnings (Broadway et al, 2014). This leaves the Norwegian study 
(Markussen et al, 2015) as the single study that found positive impacts on return to 
work from sickness absence, as well as a small reduction in disability beneit claims in 
the longer term – though given that the Norwegian system has generally struggled 
to implement conditionality (see earlier), the extent of conditionality and sanctioning 
that was applied is unclear.
Beyond these studies of mandatory activities, there are also two studies that look 
at the impact of sanctioning on disabled people, both from the UK. Reeves’s (2017) 
article looks at the impact on economic activity of the sanctioning of unemployment 
beneit claimants with a self-declared disability, based on spatial variation in sanctioning 
rates. He inds a link between sanctioning and greater levels of disability among the 
economically inactive (which is robust to multiple sensitivity tests), though with little 
consistent efect on levels of disability among employed people. While the design 
is partially limited by data availability and the possibility of confounding in non-
experimental cross-sectional data, it provides suggestive evidence that the sanctioning 
of disabled people on unemployment beneit may drive them into economic inactivity.
The other study is conducted by the UK National Audit Oice (2016), and uses 
a strong design, exploiting the random assignment of disability beneit claimants to 
employment service providers (with diferent sanctioning referral rates) within an 
area. They found negative impacts of sanctioning on employment outcomes among 
disability beneit claimants, which seem to increase over time. Sanctioning referral rates 
may relect other factors that inluence employment rates (eg quality of employment 
support), though the study does control for both diferences in claimant characteristics 
and diferences in the provider’s overall performance. Still, given that the National 
Audit Oice study also shows positive impacts of sanctioning on employment for 
non-disabled people, the study strongly suggests that the employment consequences 
of sanctioning – at least within what I have described as the ‘compliance-based’ ideal 
type of disability conditionality – may be much worse for disabled than non-disabled 
people.
Overall, the limited but methodologically strong evidence that exists suggests 
that the employment efects of conditionality are much less positive for disabled 
than non-disabled people. Two studies even suggest that the stronger forms of 
disability conditionality are counterproductive, whether they are implemented 
with strong rehabilitation links (Denmark) or instead with a focus on compliance 
(the UK), with both studies inding a reduction in employment among disabled 
people. The four other studies show a mixture of negative, positive and null results; 
the one unambiguously positive impact (in Norway) may suggest that less onerous 
conditionality in a supportive context may have positive efects, or may simply relect 
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What are the wider effects of conditionality on disabled people?
The inal element to consider is whether conditionality has any wider impacts, 
particularly on income/destitution and health. If conditionality makes disabled people 
more likely to enter suitable work, then any increased employment could potentially 
improve both of these outcomes. However, not only are there concerns about whether 
conditionality drives even non-disabled people towards poorer job matches, but the 
evidence also ofers little reason to believe that disabled people’s employment chances 
will be increased by conditionality – and they may even be harmed (see the previous 
section). Yet, even without inluencing employment, there are reasons to believe that 
conditionality and sanctioning may inluence poverty and ill-health.
Given that sanctioning involves withdrawing money from people who lack jobs 
(and also raising the numbers of people without work or beneits), there is a clear 
mechanism by which sanctioning afects income. This will partly be mitigated by 
other sources of support, but it seems unlikely that such support is universal. It is 
therefore unsurprising that, for example, almost one third of destitute people in the 
UK in Fitzpatrick et al’s (2016: 29) study said that they had been sanctioned, while 
a UK area-based study found that the increased sanctioning of unemployment 
beneit claimants led to greater food bank use (Loopstra et al, 2016). For disabled 
people, the issues may be even more acute given the greater costs of disability, the 
greater challenges that many disabled people have in the labour market and the 
added challenges of responding to sanctions among those with learning disabilities 
and mental ill-health (Inclusion London, 2016). Both case studies from disabled 
people’s organisations (eg Inclusion London, 2016) and qualitative research (Dwyer 
et al, 2016) in the UK have found that disabled beneit claimants who have been 
sanctioned struggled inancially, sometimes with very damaging consequences. While 
the sanctioning of disabled people is also non-negligible in Australia, no evidence on 
its impacts is currently available.
Conditionality may also negatively afect disabled people’s health. Partly, this may 
stem from inancial issues following sanctions (as in one prominent UK case6), but it 
may also come from the stress of conditionality itself – particularly in ‘compliance-
based’ systems such as the UK, where unreasonable requirements may sometimes be 
set, and where minor lapses in compliance may lead to signiicant inancial penalties 
(see earlier). The rollout of a new disability assessment in the UK has been linked 
to suicides and mental ill-health (Barr et al, 2016), and while much of this efect is 
likely to be around inancial worries around beneit eligibility (Garthwaite, 2014), 
there also seems to be considerable anxiety around the conditionality regime that 
accompanied it. For example:
• Disabled unemployment and disability beneit claimants in a large-scale piece 
of qualitative research regularly referred to the anxiety-inducing efects of 
conditionality (Dwyer et al, 2016), which can also be seen in the case studies 
in the present special issue taken from the same project (McNeill et al, 2017).
• A recent inquiry into beneit sanctions by a UK parliamentary select committee 
mentioned the possibility that sanctions ‘can have negative impacts on mental 
health’, based on evidence from disabled people’s organisations and disability 
charities on the harmful consequences experienced by their members and clients 
























































• In one non-representative survey, 85% of WRAG claimants reported feeling 
anxious about sanctions (Hale, 2014).
• The British Psychological Society (2016) and four other associations involved 
in mental health treatment recently signed a statement saying that ‘the sanctions 
process may be detrimental to people’s mental health and wellbeing’.
• There are even several anecdotal reports in the UK of claimants dying from 
suicide or heart attacks while subject to conditionality,7 though the extent to 
which conditionality can be blamed for these individual cases is contested.
It is unclear how common these issues are, and robust quantitative studies of the 
average health efects of UK conditionality on disabled people should be undertaken. 
However, the volume of case-study evidence from claimants, campaigners, health 
professionals and qualitative researchers strongly suggests that the UK’s compliance-
based system of conditionality can have negative efects on health. Further research 
from outside the UK is needed to understand whether all forms of conditionality 
for disabled people potentially have similar efects.
Other efects of conditionality and sanctioning have been suggested in the literature. 
For example, Lohman et al (2004) show that children in sanctioned families in the 
US had worse developmental outcomes, and Paxson and Waldfogel (2003) ind that 
US states with tougher sanctions policies had greater levels of child maltreatment. 
However, in both cases, the methodology is relatively weak – there are other diferences 
between sanctioned families and sanctioning states that are di cult to account for 
– and this evidence does not justify strong conclusions (as accepted by Griggs and 
Evans, 2010: 27). Similarly, while Machin and Marie (2006) ind that areas afected by 
a tougher beneit regime in the UK had greater rises in crime, Fallesen et al (2014) 
ind that workfare in Denmark reduced crime levels. In both cases, plausible mechanisms 
can be outlined, but irmer conclusions await further research.
Conclusion
While bodies such as the OECD recommend introducing conditionality for disabled 
people, they provide little evidence as to either its implementation or its impacts. In 
this article, I therefore reviewed available evidence in the academic and grey literature, 
alongside a new international review of disability assessment in 10 countries based 
on over 140 documents and 38 expert interviews. The indings can be summarised 
as the following ‘stylised facts’ (an approach taken from Martin, 2015):
1. Many states formally require disabled people to participate in steps towards work. 
However, sanctioning itself is rare, with most countries using sanctioning as an 
emergency backstop for repeated non-compliance with rehabilitation. Only in 
Australia and the UK is sanctioning less rare, seemingly being used as a non-
negligible response to instances of perceived non-compliance.
2. There are several models of implementing conditionality for disabled people. 
Demanding systems (high conditionality, strong rehabilitation links) invest heavily 
in assessment and support, which claimants are then required to participate in. 
Passive systems (low conditionality, weak rehabilitation links) have on-paper 
conditionality requirements but do not sanction claimants in practice because of a 
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requirements despite poor links to assessment and support – potentially sometimes 
implementing sanctions unfairly.
3. In terms of employment outcomes:
 – The evidence, on balance, suggests that sanctioning increases job entry among 
non-disabled people – but often to low-quality jobs, and it also increases the 
numbers of people not claiming beneits who are not in work.
 – However, a priori, the impact of conditionality on disabled people is likely 
to be more negative than its impact on non-disabled people, and is likely to 
vary according to the way conditionality is implemented.
 – The limited but robust existing evidence focusing on disabled people suggests 
that sanctioning may have zero or even negative impacts on work-related 
outcomes.
4. In terms of wider impacts, individual case studies in ‘compliance-based’ systems 
suggest that sanctioning in the absence of other support can lead to destitution, 
and that conditionality can negatively inluence mental health.
It is worth ending by emphasising that conditionality for disabled people is simply 
diferent to conditionality for non-disabled people – its implementation is more 
challenging, and its impacts may well be more negative. While the present article 
has reviewed the available evidence and conducted a new international review 
of implementation, the published evidence is relatively scarce, and multi-country 
reviews necessarily sacriice some depth in order to achieve international breadth. 
Rather than simply assuming that the existing evidence base for unemployment 
and social assistance beneits will suice, it is therefore crucial to add to the limited 
existing evidence base on disability and conditionality in all respects: its extent, its 
implementation, its impacts on employment and its wider impacts.
Notes
1. Requirements are more demanding on unemployment beneits (where claimants can 
be required to take particular jobs), and the sanctions more severe (on unemployment 
beneits, claimants lose their entire beneit for four to 52 weeks; on disability beneits, 
they can lose about two thirds of their beneit [soon to rise to the full beneit] for one 
to four weeks). Around 40% of Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) sanctionees and 10–20% of 
WRAG sanctionees receive hardship payments (Webster, 2015: 8–11).
2. See: https://inequalitiesblog.wordpress.com/2012/09/27/paul-gregg-disability-
employment-speech/
3. Evaluations of reforms that combine conditionality and support (such as ‘Pathways 
to Work’ in the UK) have been cited elsewhere as evidence for the efectiveness of 
conditionality (OECD, 2010: 108; Pickles et al, 2016: 41). However, I do not consider 
this evidence here as the contribution of conditionality itself is unclear (as admitted by 
the OECD, 2010: 108).
4. Exemptions were 13–30% in Norwegian municipalities (after six months sickness 
absence) and 17% in Denmark (at the start of sickness claims).
5. Rehwald et al (2015) further focus on the diferences between diferent types of 
mandatory activities (inding that some are harmful and others beneicial), but these 
results can no longer exploit the randomised nature of the intervention and are therefore 
























































6. This is the case of David Clapson, who died from a lack of insulin after running out of 
money to keep his fridge working (see: http://www.disabilityrightsuk.org/news/2016/
march/support-petition-over-death-david-clapson).
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